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The primary concern of monetary policy is to ensure price stability. Such is the mandate of the ESCB
establishedbytheMaastrichtTreaty, buttheobjective, spelledoutinvariousways, iscommontoevery
other central bank. In a somewhat old fashioned language, the objective of price stability requires that
monetary policy provide a nominal anchor, that it anchor expectations. For once, the objective seems
easier to attain in practice than in theory.
Central banks in developed countries have been very successful in the last twenty five years in targe-
ting low inflation. The success has been attributed to a somewhat mechanical interest rate rule where
the short term nominal interest rate is set in response to deviations from trend of inflation and econo-
mic activity, a Taylor rule, named after John Taylor who first estimated it (Taylor, 1993). It turns out that
no policy rule of this type is able to achieve in a monetary model what it appears to achieve in reality.
The same models that give very reasonable answers to other questions, generate multiple equilibria
when monetary policy is conducted with an interest rate feedback rule whether it may respond to
future, current or past inflation.
There is an extensive literature on this issue of central importance to monetary policy making, dating
back to Sargent and Wallace(1975) whoshowedthat a policythat targets the interest rate gives rise to
multipleequilibria. Most of thelaterliteraturehasfocusedonconditionsfor localdeterminacy, meaning
that, while the multiplicity of equilibria remains, there might be only one equilibrium in a particular ne-
ighborhood of interest. McCallum (1981) is the main responsible for triggering this literature, showing
that there are indeed interest rate feedback rules that guarantee local uniqueness. Technically, this
has been very useful because it has allowed economists to abstract from a problem that was not easy
to solve, and concentrate on other issues focusing on the unique local equilibria. Unfortunately, as po-
inted out by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001, 2002), the same policy rules that ensure lo-
cally determinacy typically generate global indeterminacy, so that the alternative equilibria can
converge to other steady states or cycle around the original one.
In this note, and based on Adao, Correia and Teles (2006), we discuss how interest rate rules can be
used to implement a unique equilibrium with stable prices. We first consider an economy with a finite
horizon and show that nominal interest rates are not a sufficient policy instrument. In a finite horizon
economy a finite number of equilibrium variables is restricted by a finite number of equilibrium conditi-
ons. If policy specifies restrictions for the nominal interest rates only, then there are more unknowns
than equations and there are multiple equilibria. This result does not depend on whether there is an
exogenous target for the interest rate or whether it responds to endogenous variables. The number of
equations is the same. Similarly, whether prices are flexible or sticky also does not matter.
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* The opinions are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economics and Research Department.We proceed to considering an economy that lasts forever. We first discuss in a simplified model how
economists usuallyapproachthe multiplicityproblem, byconcentratingon conditionsfor localdetermi-
nacy. Finally, weshow, as in Adao, Correia and Teles (2006), that there is a policyrule that implements
a unique global equilibrium. This rule would not work in the finite horizon economy.
The interest rate feedback rule that implements a unique equilibrium globally in a price targeting the
rulewherethenominalinterestraterespondstotheforecastofthefuturepricelevelaswellasthefore-
cast of future economicactivity. Unfortunatelythe ruleis not as robust as onewouldhope. Whether the
time horizon is infinite or finite, even if arbitrarily large, makes a fundamental difference and that is not
an issue that economists can take a stand on. But, furthermore, in order to be effective the rule would
require a knowledge of the economic structure that is not realistic.
Robert Lucas (1996) wrotein his Noble lecture that “Central bankers and even some monetary econo-
mists talk knowledgeablyof using high interest rates to control inflation, but I knowof no evidencefrom
even one economy linking these variables in a useful way (...).” We will have to add that some of us,




titively, and a government. The economyhas a finite horizon T. There are shocks to technologyand to
government expenditures.
The representativehouseholdhaspreferencesoverconsumptionC t ,andleisure L t ,describedbythe
expected utility function
















where is a discount factor. The technology uses labor only and is linear
YA N tt t 
for 0  tT , whereC t is aggregate consumption ,NL tt  1 is labor and At is the technology para-
meter.
We assume that householdsmust purchase consumptionwithmoneyaccordingto the cash-in-advan-
ce constraint
PC M tt t  (2.2)
for0  tT ,whereP t isthepriceoftheconsumptiongoodinunitsofmoneyand M t aremoneybalan-
ces usedfor transactions. Each periodis dividedinto twosubperiods, withthe assets market operating
in the first subperiod and the goods market in the second.
The households start periodt with nominal wealth  t . They decide to hold money, M t , and to buyB t
riskless nominal bonds that payRB tt one period later.R t is the gross nominal interest rate at datet.
Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of periodt they face the constraint
MB tt t   (2.3)
for0  tT .
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rate, and pay lump sum taxes,Tt . Thus, the nominal wealth households bring to periodt  1is
 t t tt tt tt t MR BP CW NT      1 , (2.4)
for0  tT . After periodT, there is a subperiod for the clearing of debts, where money can be used to
pay debts. Wealth in the terminal period cannot be negative,
 t  1 0. (2.5)
The households’ problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the restrictions (2.3), (2.2),
(2.4), together with the no-Ponzi games condition (2.5).



































for01   tT. Condition(2.6) sets the intratemporalmarginalrate of substitution betweenleisure and
consumption equal to the real wage adjusted for the cost of using money,R t . Condition (2.7) is an in-
tertemporal marginal condition necessary for the optimal choice of risk-free nominal bonds. The other
conditions are the constraints with equality and the terminal condition
T   1 0. (2.8)







t   ,0 . (2.9)
The policy variables are lump sum taxes,Tt , interest rates,R t , money supplies, M t , state noncontin-
gent public debt,B t . The period by period government budget constraints are
MB 00 0  
MB
MR BP GP T
tT
tt
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1
,
TT T T T T T T MR BPGP T      1 0 (2.10)
Market clearing in the goods and labor market requires
CGA N ttt t  ,
and
NL tt  1 ,
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Equilibrium
An equilibriumis a sequence of policyvariables, quantities and prices such that the private agents sol-
ve their problems given the sequences of policy variables and prices, the budget constraint of the go-
vernment is satisfied, markets clear, and the policy sequence is in the set defined by the policy.
The equilibrium conditions for the variables CLRMBT tt t ttt ,,, ,, are the resource constraints













,,   0 (2.12)
thoseareobtainedfrom the householdsintratemporalconditions(2.6) andthe firms optimalconditions
(2.9), the cash in advance constraints (2.2), the intertemporal conditions (2.7) and the budget constra-
ints (2.10), as well as the government policy rules, to be specified below.
3. INTEREST RATE POLICY DOES NOT ENSURE PRICE STABILITY
An equilibrium in the economy described above is characterized by a finite number of equations and
unknowns. A necessary condition for there to be a unique equilibrium is that the number of equations
equals the number of the unknowns. Interest rate rules, whether these are sequences of numbers or
feedback rules, functions of future, current or past variables, are not sufficient restrictions. They are
never able to pin down unique equilibria.
To see this, notice taht from the resource constraints, (2.11), the intratemporal conditions (2.12), and
the cash in advance constraints holding with equality, (2.2), we obtain the functions  CC R tt  and








 , 0  tT . We can substitute these variables in the intertemporal condi-
tions (2.7), so that the system of equilibrium conditions restricting the policy variables RMP tt t ,,



















































 , ,..., . 0
The budget constraints restrict, not uniquely, the levels of state noncontingent debts and taxes. Assu-
ming these policy variables are not set exogenously we can ignore those restrictions.
Supposethe interest rates are determinedexogenously. In that case there are still more variablesthan
unknowns. If the money supplies were also set exogenouslyin every state in the terminal period, then
Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
Summer 2007 | Articles
60theconditionsabovewoulddeterminethemoneystock ineverystateinthepreviousperiods. That way
the price levels would also be pinned down in every period and state. The degrees of multiplicity are
therefore the number of states in the terminal period. The nominal interest rates restrict the conditional
average growth rate of money supply, they do not restrict how money supply is distributed across sta-
tes. In this economy with uncertainty there is still the need for a nominal anchor for every history. In a
deterministic economy only one money supply would be missing, one nominal anchor.
In this economy, if instead of targeting the interest rate, there was a feedback rule for the interest rate
whereit wouldbe respondingto endogenousvariables, nothingwouldchange. There wouldstill be the
same number of equations and unknowns and the degree of multiplicity would be the same. Similarly
this result does not depend on preferences or technology, and it also does not depend on whether
prices are flexible or sticky.
In the followingsection, the economylasts forever. It is the same economy, but withan infinite horizon.
We illustrate howthis problem of multiplicityis usuallyhandled, by imposing conditions such that there
is a single equilibrium in a neighborhood of interest, so that a particular equilibrium may be locally de-
terminate. We also show that in the infinite horizon economy there are rules that implement unique
global equilibria.
4. AN INFINITE HORIZON ECONOMY
4.1. Local determinacy
In monetary models withmultiple equilibriait is possible to conduct policyso that there is a single equi-
librium in the neighborhood of a steady state. In this case we say that there is a determinate equilibri-
um. Most of the analysis in monetary models focus on that particular equilibrium.
We will now consider the analogous infinite horizon model but will simplify the structure assuming that
the utility is linear in consumption. For linear consumption the log-linearized intertemporal conditions
approximated around a deterministic steady state with constant nominal interest rate and constant in-
flation  *, which is also the target, are

  REP P tt t t   1 0.
Suppose now that the interest rate rule is the forward rule
   RE tt     1
so that the interestrate is raisedabovethe steadystate whenthe inflationforecast is abovethe target
 *. Then we have
     10 1 E tt  ,
so that for 	1 , expected inflation is pinned down, but the price level in each date and state is not.
Suppose now that the interest rate rule is
  R tt  
where 
1 . Then, from
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we have
   
tt t E  1 0
With 	1 , there is a bounded solution and a continuum of unbounded solutions. If   
  0, then   t  0,
t  0 but if   0 0 	 , the inflation path is explosive.
1
The bounded solution is the determinate equilibrium
  t  0.
The equilibrium inflation is equal to the target and given an historical price level P 1, the path for the
price level is pinned down. The unbounded solutions cannot be analyzed with the linearized model,
which is only valid for small deviations around the steady state. In general there are other equilibria in
the nonlinear model, which may cycle or converge to other steady states (see Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001, 2002)
In the followingsection weshowthat there are interest rate rules that do not react to inflation but rather
to a forecast of the price level that implement unique global equilibria. These are the rules analyzed in
Adao, Correia and Teles (2006).
In the log-linearized model the rule would be
 RE P tt t  1.
Then from the intertemporal condition
  RE P P tt t t  1 ,
we have
 P t  0
so that there is indeed a unique global solution.
4.2. Rules that implement unique global equilibria
Hereweconsidertheoriginalnonlinearmodelforgeneralpreferencesbutwithaninfinitehorizon.Sup-


















where  t is an exogenous variable. Then there is a unique global equilibrium. To see this, notice that
the intertemporal condition (2.7) can be written as
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Given the functions  CC R tt  and  CC R tt  obtained using the resource constraints, (2.11),
and the intratemporal conditions, (2.12), we can use (4.2) above to determine the sequence of price
levels P t . The money supply is determined endogenously using the cash-in-advance condition.
Depending on the process for  t , a particularly desirable outcome can be implemented. In this model
the first best equilibrium can be achieved with the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate. This





We sawin the previoussectionthat in the finitehorizoneconomytherewerenorulesthat implemented
unique equilibria.Indeed in the finite horizon economythis rule cannot be used in the last period, since





















For periodT,the rule cannot be used becausethere is nothingto forecast atT, and if the nominalinter-
est rates are set exogenously, the price level in the different states is not pinned down. If the economy
lasted forever, there would be no last period and the rule would always work.
The forward looking interest rate feedback rules that implement unique global equilibria resemble to
some extent the rules that appear to be followed by central banks. The nominal interest rate reacts
positively to the forecast of future consumption
2. It also reacts positively to the forecast of the future
pricelevel.This lastfeatureoftherulesislessconventional(seeWoodford(2003)forWicksellianprice
targeting rules).
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(2) It does not react to labor if the utility function is separable in leisure.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this note wediscuss, based on Adao, Correia and Teles (2006), howmonetary policycan be used to
implement a unique stable price equilibrium. We show that in a monetary model with a finite horizon,
where the degrees of freedom in conducting policy can be counted exactly, interest rate rules will not
implement unique equilibria. Instead in an infinite horizon there are feedback rules that can achieve
that.
The rules that implement unique equilibria are price targeting rules where the interest rate is raised
whenthe forecast of the future price level goes up. It also reacts positivelyto the forecast of future eco-
nomic activity. Unfortunatelyin order for the rule to be effective there is the need for a knowledgeof the
economic structure that is not realistic. Also, the fact that the rule wouldnot workin a finite horizon mo-
del even if arbitrarily large is also an obvious fragility.
In theendwehaveto concludethatmoreworkhasto bedoneinthedevelopmentof modelsoralterna-
tive waysof conductingpolicyso that wecan be reasonablyconfidentthat policyis ableto implementa
unique stable price equilibrium.
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